The United States had throughout the Cold War and within the first decade of the 21st century established dominance in terms of space-based military capabilities, including satellite navigation through its Global Positioning System (GPS) and a wide array of reconnaissance and communications satellites. These enabled US forces to access targeting data and coordinate their forces anywhere on Earth.
Satellite navigation has resulted in an array of GPS-guided munitions including the 155mm Excalibur artillery shell, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rocket fired by the HIMARS and M270 platforms, and the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) dropped via US warplanes.
Longer-range precision guided weapons using both GPS and a process called Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator (DSMAC) utilize images provided by reconnaissance satellites to find targets, obtain specific coordinates, and to guide the munitions themselves.
Such weapons were used in various US wars from the 1990s onward to great effect.
While the Soviet Union created its own satellite navigation system, Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) which the Russian Federation still employs, the use of this system for guiding weapons was not widespread until relatively recently. Large-scale use has only been observed in Syria from 2015 onward, and most recently in the Special Military Operation (SMO).
Soviet and Russian reconnaissance satellites, based on publicly available information, have been employed in far fewer numbers than their American counterparts. And while both the US and Russia have communication satellites, the US is the only nation with a low-earth orbit (LEO) internet constellation, Starlink, consisting of over 6,000 satellites.
Starlink provides low-latency internet connections anywhere on Earth. For military forces using Starlink, it not only enables troops to communicate with each other, but also to guide remote-control platforms like aerial and maritime drones far beyond what traditional transmitted radio signals could achieve. Such drones would only be limited in range by their fuel or electric charge as long as a connection with Starlink was maintained.
While this has provided the US and its allies with advantages even on today’s battlefield, these advantages have been countered, and similar capabilities are being developed by not only Russia, but also China.
Countermeasures
Such US weapons had until recently defined modern combat, leading many Western analysts into believing the US and its allies enjoyed unparalleled advantages on the battlefield. While the Soviet Union and initially the Russian Federation did not prioritize the production of precision guided weapons using space-based capabilities, both recognized the danger of US-NATO weapons using these capabilities and invested heavily in countermeasures.
This has resulted in the creation of Russia’s modern air and missile defense systems as well as a variety of electronic warfare capabilities, both of which are considered some of the best in the world.
In Ukraine, Western analysts predicted the transfer of US-made GPS-guided weapons to Ukrainian forces would be “game-changers.” After just weeks of use, many of these weapons were rendered ineffective either because of Russia’s ability to intercept them or jam their GPS signal, causing them to miss their target.
CNN, in its May 2023 article titled, “Russia’s jamming of US-provided rocket systems complicates Ukraine’s war effort,” would report on HIMARS-launched GMLRS missing their targets due to Russian electronic warfare.
The Washington Post in its May 2024 article titled, “Russian jamming leaves some high-tech U.S. weapons ineffective in Ukraine,” would likewise report other US-made GPS-guided weapons were being jammed including air-dropped JDAMs and 155mm Excalibur artillery shells.
The article would note that the problem with Russian jamming became so bad, “Washington simply stopped providing Excalibur shells because of the high failure rate.”
Russia’s ability to jam US-made GPS-guided weapons has provided a tremendous defensive capability for Russian forces. Russia also has developed and now deployed on a large scale its own satellite-guided munitions. This includes the Tornado-S guided rocket, Iskander ballistic missile, a variety of longer-range cruise missiles, and Russia’s own version of the JDAM, referred to as the FAB bomb series ranging from 250-3,000 kg munitions.
In addition to disrupting satellite-guided munitions and countering them with its own versions of such weapons, Russia has also managed to jam Ukraine’s access to US satellite communication networks. This includes SpaceX’s revolutionary Starlink network, disrupted by Russian jamming, according to the New York Times in its May 2024 article titled, “Russia, in New Push, Increasingly Disrupts Ukraine’s Starlink Service.”
Not only did the New York Times describe the disruption of Ukraine’s use of Starlink, it also reported that Russia was coming into possession of its own Starlink terminals, allowing Russian forces to enjoy many of the advantages Ukrainian forces had.
Weapons and networks depending on US space-based capabilities that were meant to be “game-changers” have left Ukraine at a severe disadvantage. The collective West’s investment in small quantities of highly sophisticated weapons and networks came at the cost of investing sufficiently in larger quantities of cheaper weapons like artillery shells and armor, leaving Ukraine with little of either.
While the US and Europe are attempting to rebuild their military industrial capacity to catch up with Russia (and China) in terms of these simpler but still essential weapons and munitions, Russia and China are catching up in terms of sophisticated space-based capabilities.
Closing the Gap
Both Russia and China plan to deploy their own LEO internet constellations. Both nations also are investing in larger numbers of reconnaissance satellites. China in particular has been closing the gap with speed that has surprised the collective West.
The Economist in a March 2024 article titled, “China’s satellites are improving rapidly. The PLA will benefit,” would report:
Over the past decade, China has massively increased the number of satellites it has in operation, to a total of over 600 today. Of those, more than 360 are intelligence, surveillance or reconnaissance (ISR) satellites, which observe the Earth using sunlight, infrared waves or reflections from radar pulses. China’s ISR fleet is second in size only to America’s, and its capabilities are finding appeal in the global marketplace. America recently sanctioned two Chinese firms for allegedly giving satellite images of Ukraine to the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary outfit.
The quantity and quality of Chinese satellites is improving, enabling a wide array of economic and military applications.
Chinese companies providing customers with satellite imagery just as Western-based companies do, may be allowing Russian forces to access the same up-to-date images that Ukraine is receiving, leveling the playing field in terms of ISR, but allowing Russia to leverage its advantage in its vastly larger long-range missile and drone arsenal to better utilize the targeting data.
While Russia has its own space-based ISR capabilities because LEO satellites taking high-resolution images can only pass over an area of interest briefly and requires time to pass over the same area again (a process that can take hours or days depending on the satellite’s specific orbit) the more satellites Russia has access to, the more frequently it can receive pictures from a specific area.
The Economist also talks about Chinese satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO) able to “watch” huge areas of the planet, including the Pacific Ocean, to track US warships and other maritime vessels in real time. Based on China’s rapidly growing space-based capabilities, The Economist concludes that “the result might be an era of mutually assured vulnerability in space.”
This not only includes space-based capabilities aiding warfare on Earth, but also capabilities able to target other nation’s space-based capabilities in orbit.
Orbital Warfare
The US, Russia, and China have all conducted demonstrations of anti-satellite missiles launched from either aircraft or from the planet’s surface, successfully destroying old, dysfunctional satellites of each respective nation.
Additionally, the US has developed the X-37, an unmanned space plane launched into orbit for 100s of days at a time, capable of changing its orbit several times during a single mission and returning to Earth where it is refurbished and launched again.
While the space plane’s missions are classified, it is speculated that it would be possible to “inspect” satellites of other nations and even carry weapons capable of disabling or destroying targeted satellites.
But the US is not the only nation with such capabilities. China’s Reusable Experimental Spacecraft is likewise capable of being launched, remaining in orbit for long periods of time, changing its orbit and carrying a variety of payloads, before returning to Earth where it is refurbished and reused. In theory, it should be capable of performing any mission the US X-37 can.
Reusable Launch Systems
Russia or China’s ability to fully close the gap with the United States depends on several key capabilities, all of which the US possesses solely because of SpaceX, a relatively new company outcompeting America’s traditional aerospace giants, Lockheed, Boeing, and their joint United Launch Alliance (ULA).
SpaceX’s success stems from the purpose-driven philosophy of the company, focused on making human civilization multiplanetary. In pursuit of this goal, SpaceX has revolutionized reusable rockets, driving costs down significantly while allowing a much greater launch cadence per year.
Its Falcon 9 rockets launch payloads into orbit, with the first stage booster returning to Earth under the power of its own rocket engines. The booster is recovered, checked, and can be returned to flight as quickly as one week.
China is now conducting over 60 orbital launches a year. In 2020 and 2021, China conducted more launches than the United States. But because of the success and expanded use of SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket family, the US has since conducted more launches in 2022 and 2023 and is expected to outpace China this year as well.
The ability to quickly and cheaply launch payloads into orbit allows SpaceX to build its Starlink constellation. It also allows the US and other customers to launch satellites almost on demand.
In a future conflict where satellites are being disabled or destroyed by adversaries, this capability would allow the US to replace satellites as quickly as they can be built or as quickly as essential satellites held in strategic storage can be prepared and integrated with the Falcon 9 rocket.
This is a capability both Russia and China currently lack. Reusability is key to achieving the launch cadence and capabilities SpaceX affords the US government.
Both Russia and China are developing reusable rockets. Russia’s Amur rocket, visually similar to SpaceX’s Falcon 9, is still years away from its first testflight.
China, on the other hand, has a large number of both state-owned enterprises and private companies developing rockets, including reusable systems. In June 2024, the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology (a subsidiary of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation or CASC) performed a 12 km test flight of a reusable 3.8 meter diameter first stage booster. The test flight of a full-scale launch vehicle is scheduled for next year.
The capabilities SpaceX provides the US government are the result of a systemic anomaly. The US government and the special interests that dominate foreign and domestic policy are motivated by the accumulation of wealth and power. Lockheed, Boeing, and their joint United Launch Alliance represent a more accurate picture of typical contemporary American innovation and progress.
ULA launched only 3 rockets last year. The enterprise maximizes profit by avoiding investment into the sweeping innovation SpaceX has pursued. SpaceX’s rapid innovation cannot be replicated across the rest of US industry precisely because SpaceX is purpose-driven while the vast majority of US industry is profit-driven.
It is because of this that – should China maintain purpose-driven policy and industry – it will eventually close the gap between itself and the US in terms of space-based capabilities, before the gap begins to grow, but this time in China’s favor.
China’s mix of private and state-owned enterprise coupled with a purpose-driven political system has already demonstrated its ability to close industrial and technological gaps in everything from semiconductor production, electric vehicles, and smartphones, to shipbuilding, missiles, and trains.
Should China master reusable rockets, placing vast constellations of satellites into orbit mirroring Starlink, being able to replace satellites as quickly as they can be built and/or integrated with a launch vehicle, and any other critical capability required in orbit above the economies and battlefields of Earth, will be well within China’s reach.
Just as American dominance has eroded elsewhere across economic and military domains, its dominance in space may be short-lived. As long as the United States pursues unsustainable hegemony above all other nations rather than finding a constructive role to play among all other nations, it will continue to suffer from the misallocation of resources, both financial and human, while Russia, China, and the rest of the multipolar world continue to expand, both here on Earth, and above it.
Brian Berletic is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.